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TECHNICAL ADVISEMENT MEMORANDUM NO. 106-9 
To: P r o g r a m  Manager, Geodetic Satellite Physics  and Astronomy 
P r o g r a m s ,  Office of Space Science and Applications, 
NASA He adqua rt e r s 
From:  PRC GEOS Reliability Asses  sment  Team 
Subject: Reliability Assessment  of the GEOS A Power Supply 
1. Introduction 
Exhibit 1 is the diagram of the power supply that will  be used 
fo r  modeling purposes. The blocks labeled U. r ep resen t  par t icular  
collections of electronic pa r t s ,  and the c i r c l e s  labeled W represent  
par t icu lar  I' output I' points of interest .  
1, j 
i, j 
The GEOS power supply system compr ises  th ree  subsystems: (1) 
the main power supply, ( 2 )  the optical power supply, and (3)  the t r ans -  
ponder power supply. 
W 5 2  , a r e  ORed together so that the loads connected to  these  points will  
have a higher probability of receiving the i r  required power. 
power subsystems a r e  designed to supply the i r  respective loads within 
the operational constraints  of the spacecraf t  system. 
a r r a y ,  f o r  example, can  supply pwwer to all loads zor;nccted t z  it with- 
out the aid of the main battery. The bat tery,  in this c a s e ,  is provided 
for  eclipse operation. The optical and transponder so l a r  a r r a y s ,  how- 
e v e r ,  require  the help of batteries to  supply the peak cu r ren t  demands 
of the loads which the so la r  cells alone cannot furnish,  
As shown in Exhibit 1, two outputs, W22 and 
The three  
The main so la r  
In the case  of the transponder power supply, the SECOR t r ans -  
ponder will  requi re  32.8 watts  of power when in the t r ansmi t  mode. 
The range and range ra te  transponder requi res  15.3 watts in the t r a n s -  
mit mode. 
11.6 watts. 
peak cu r ren t s  of approximately 13.5 amperes  for  ,short  durations. 
The t ransponder  solar a r r a y  is capable of providing only 
Fur the rmore ,  the optical beacon flash assembly  requi res  
The 
' ,  
& 
1 
optical solar  a r r a y  is capable of only 1.2 amperes  when at an  optimum 
sun angle. In both cases ,  ba t te r ies  a r e  required for  proper  operation. 
Thus, failure of the bat tery in these  subsystems resu l t s  in fa i lure  of 
the pr imary  function of the associated subsystem. 
Several commands a r e  provided for  increased flexibility of oper-  
The transponder and optical supplies a r e  each provided with a ation. 
sys t em of power dump r e s i s t o r s ,  the purpose of which is to  prevent 
overcharging, and consequent overheating, of the bat ter ies .  These are 
normally switched in and out automatically by thermostat ic  switches that 
sense battery temperature .  However, the power dump r e s i s t o r s  can be 
manually controlled f rom the ground via commands in the event of mal- 
function o r  i f  additional control is required.  
The main battery can be switched in o r  out as required by use  of 
commands 10a and lob. This gives protection against  bat tery failure 
and a l so  provides a means of protecting the bat tery f rom overheating 
i f  most  of the "main" loads happen to  be disconnected. During normal  
operation, however, the main power supply load demand is expected to  
be near ly  constant, thus eliminating the need fo r  power dump protection 
of this battery. The main and memory  d-c/d-c  conver te rs  a r e  operated 
in switchable standby redundancy. The command conver te r ,  of neces-  
si ty,  is operated in active redundancy. 
plus the availability of various commands fo r  the power supply sys tem 
that permit  switching, isolating, and bypassing- -has  provided a flexible 
overall  design. 
The use of redundant c i rcu i t s - -  
Those fai lure  effects of the pr ime power sys tem which can occur 
as a resul t  of component fa i lures  a r e  tabulated in  the appendix to this 
TAM. The probability of occurrence of these fai lure  effects is shown 
in the following analysis to be low. 
The models were  developed with th ree  tasks  in mind. The first 
was to  allow the calculation of the probability of having the proper  out- 
put at each of the 19 output points at the end of one year.  
was to  allow the calculation of par t icular  combinations of outputs of in- 
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where P ( U .  . )  = probability that the 
P(W. . )  = probability that the 
1, J 
1* J 
(i, j)th unit is operable 
(i, j) th output is available 
Q ( X i s j )  = 1 - P ( X i ,  j) where X.  stands f o r  U. . o r  W. . 
1, j 1 s  J 1s J 
Qs(U. . )  = probability that the 
1s J 
unit U is shorted 
i, j 
All of the above equations a r e  a function of time, but, s ince they will  be 
evaluated only at the end of one yea r ,  the t ime notation is suppressed. 
Achievement of the second task will ,  in general ,  requi re  addi- 
tional input information. However, anticipating the requirement  for  
the probability of adequate power for the optical beacon, the following 
equations will satisfy. Let P(0P) be the probability of being able to  
provide sufficient power for  the optical beacon, assuming that,  i f  nec-  
e s sa ry ,  the other experiments will  be sacrificed. Then, 
Equation (20) follows f rom Exhibit 1 and f rom the fact  that the optical 
power source is both necessary  and sufficient for  the beacon experiment. 
The third task is accomplished as follows: 
a distinct entity, is considered to be in  one of 2 
each having a different combination of the n units shown in Exhibit 1 
operating, with the remainder  failed). To each of these  s ta tes ,  a value 
is assigned in t e r m s  of the effect on the experimental  payload. 
des i red  figure of m e r i t  is then defined as 
The power supply, as 
n possible s ta tes  (i. e. , 
The 
2n 
FOM = 1 P(Sk) V(Sk) 
k= 1 
where  S 
in the kth state,  and V(Sk) is the relative value of the kth state. 
vast  major i ty  of possible s ta tes  will  effectively 
represents  the kth s ta te ,  P(Sk) is the probability of being 
The 
k 
1 d rop  out of the 
'Dependent on number of decimal  places car r ied .  
6 
expression because of e i ther  insignificant value o r  insignificant 
probability. 
2. Unit Probabilitv Calculations 
The prerequis i tes  f o r  the calculation of any of the above tasks  
a r e  the various unit probabilities. 
fo re  be devoted to deriving these probabilities. 
The following subsections will there-  
a. Solar Arrays:  U i i ,  U21, u31 
Exhibit 2 presents the configurations of the GEOS so lar  
ce l l  panels and blocking diodes. 
a r r a y s  contain a paral le l  pair  of r e s i s to r s  f o r  te lemetry purposes,  as 
indicated in  Exhibit 1. Fai lure  of an a r r a y  is assumed to occur i f  
(1) both te lemetry r e s i s to r s  fail  open, (2)  the number of blocking diode 
pa i r s  failing open is sufficient to cause significant reduction of the 
available power output, o r  (3)  the number of failed solar  cel ls  is  suffi- 
cient to cause significant reduction of the available power output. 
In addition, the main and transponder 
The probability of occurrence of the first event is readily shown 
to be insignificant; it may be expressed as 
[k(l - e- 'Rj ]2  
where 
u r e s  that a r e  "opens." 
presented in TAM No. 106-6, 
3 x , which, for all practical purposes,  can be neglected. 
X R  is the r e s i s to r  failure r a t e  and k is the proportion of fail- 
Utilizing the failure ra tes  and open/ shor t  ratio 
1 th i s  probability is seen to be l e s s  than 
The probability of occurrence of the second event is determined 
as follows: The probability of a single pair  of diodes failing open is 
Component Part Fai lure  Rate Assignments f o r  Reliability Assessment  1 
of the GEOS Satell i te,  Technical Advisement Memorandum No. 106-6 
(PRC D-1027), 8 June 1965. 
7 
8 
-7 -6 which is 2 3 x 10 , utilizing a k of 1 / 2  and a X of 0.13 x 10 . 
If k is assumed to  be unity f o r  the sake of conservat ism,  the probability 
of failure of a redundant pair  of diodes is 1.3 x . The probability 
of n such fai lures  in a n  a r r a y  i s  given by (y)pnqN-n where  N is the 
-6 number of redundant diode pa i rs  in the a r r a y  and p is, say,  1.3 x 10 
and q = 1 - p . The following table summar izes  these probabilities f o r  
the three a r r a y s  being considered. 
D 
Number of 
Redundant Main Optical Beacon 
Blocking Diode Power and Transponder 
Pairs Failed Supply Power Supplies 
0 1 - (21 x l o -6 )  1 - (16 x 
2 1  21 x 16 x 
Again, the probability of failure due to  the blocking diodes is seen to be 
negligible. 
The third event is somewhat m o r e  difficult to evaluate. The ap- 
proach is a s  follows: 
ce l l s  on one panel which contribute the i r  output t o  one of the three  
pr ime power sources.  
and 12 each for the transponder and optical so l a r  a r r a y s ,  as shown in 
Exhibit 2. 
cells coiitair;ing r r c w s  and s columns as shown in the sketch below. 
Define a group of so la r  ce l l s  t o  consis t  of those 
Thus, there a r e  16 main so la r  a r r a y  groups 




0 0  * * *  
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Failure  of a group is assumed to  be solely the resul t  of open so lar  
ce l l s ,  and the la t te r  a r e  assumed to  occur  at a ra te  of 0.1 fa i lures  per  
million hours. 
"Failure" in this context means lo s s  of cu r ren t  output of the group. 
Taking the maximum available cu r ren t  output (no failed so la r  cel ls)  as 
I , the current  output with so la r  cel ls  failed is assumed to  be I 1 
where  m is the maximum number of failed ce l l s  in the r rows of the 
group. 
the relative cur ren t  output is 
s fa i lures ,  there is ze ro  cu r ren t  out of that group. 
( -3 
That is ,  i f  in all rows of the group there  is at most one fa i lure ,  
1 - - , whereas ,  if at l ea s t  one row has  
S 
F o r  a one-year period, the probability of fa i lure  of a single so l a r  
cel l  is approximately 0.001. The probability of exactly m fai lures  in 
a par t icular  row is 
s -m P(m) = (A) (O.OO1)m (0.999) 
It is c lear  that P(m) is negligible for  m 2 2 for  the c a s e s  under 
consideration, and hence each row may  be t rea ted  as a two-stated device. 
Thus,  the probability that a par t icular  group will  have its maximum avail-  
able output current  i s  simply the probability that t he re  a r e  no fai lures  in 
the r rows, i . e . ,  
P(I) = (0,999lrS , (23 )  
and the probability of having a relative cu r ren t  output of I(l - i) f rom 
a par t icular  group is 1 - P(1) . 
Finally, the probability that exactly g groups of a par t icular  type 
are  "failed" is given by 
where C is the total number of groups of a par t icu lar  type. 
Letting M denote the main a r r a y ,  
10 
P,(g) = ('l) (0.1342)g (0.8658) 16-g 
and the expected available current  is given by 
Evaluating Equations (25)  and (26) yields an expected available c u r -  
rent  of 15.236 I .  
u r e s  is 100 (1 - ,T) percent, o r  approximately 4.5 percent.  
The cur ren t  degradation for the optical and t ransponder  a r r a y s  is 
somewhat more  difficult to  a r r ive  at because of the different configura- 
t ions of the groups in the slant and equatorial  panels. Since each a r r a y  
consis ts  of 4 slant panels (3 columns, 48 rows) and 8 equatorial  panels 
( 2  columns, 48 rows),  
Thus, degradation of cu r ren t  due to catastrophic fail- 
15.236 
8 16 +- ... + - I  3 s  CPS(4)1 -t 2 IE [PE(0)1 
where  I (0) = expected available cu r ren t  of optical a r r a y  e 
Ie(T) = expected available cu r ren t  of transponder a r r a y  
= maximum available cu r ren t  of one s lant  group 
= maximum available cu r ren t  of one equatorial  group 
IS 
IE 
P (g) = probability of g s lant  groups failing 
P (g) = probability of g equatorial  groups failing 
S 
E 
Utilizing Equation (24) in Equation (27)  yields an  expected avail-  
The maximum available cu r ren t  of able  cu r ren t  of 3.83 I + 7.66 IE . 
S 
11 
each a r r a y  is  4 I t 8 IE . Assuming that cu r ren t  is direct ly  propor- S 
tional to the number of s t r ings ,  the expected degradation of cu r ren t  due 
to  catastrophic fa i lures  is 100 [l - percent ,  o r ,  again,  1 3.83(3) t 7.66(2) 4(3) t 8(2) 
in the neighborhood of 4 percent. 
The numerical  values of expected 
nea r  the maximum available output that 
liability equal t o  1 f o r  the so la r  a r r a y s .  
P (U3$  = 1 . 
b. Main Battery: U12 
available cu r ren t  output a r e  so  
it is reasonable to  a s sume  a re- 
Thus,  P ( U l l )  = P(U21) = 
The main bat tery unit, shown schematically in Exhibit 
1 ,  consis ts  of command relay 10, one zener  diode, an  8-cell  12 AH bat- 
t e ry ,  and a parallel  redundant pa i r  of res i s tors .  
is to  provide the ability to select ,  on command, either the bat tery (com- 
mand lob)  or the zener diode (command loa, " so la r  only"). The function 
of the zener  diode is to prevent an  excessive r i s e  of the main bus voltage 
under light load o r  low tempera ture  conditions. It i s  anticipated that the 
functions of the relay and zener  diode will be required only a small pe r -  
centage of the t ime,  pr imar i ly  at the beginning of the mission. 
these two components a r e  assumed to have a reliabil i ty equal to  1. 
was  pointed out in the previous subsection, the probability of catastrophic 
fa i lure  caused by the te lemetry r e s i s t o r s  is negligible. Thus,  U12 r e -  
liability is dominated by the reliability of the battery. F o r  the purposes 
of this analysis, bat ter ies  a r e  assumed to fail open (only) at the ra te  of 
one failure per million hours  pe r  cell.  Unit U12 then has  a probability 
of successful operation of exp [-8(8,760) x 10 
bility of unsuccessful operation (losing the "bat tery only" l ine) of 0.068. 
The function of the relay 
Hence, 
As 
-6 1 5 0.932 and a proba- 
c. Power Dump Circuits:  U22,  u32 
Exhibit 1 presents  the power dump c i rcu i t s  schemat-  
ically. There  is no single component par t  fa i lure  that could be consid- 
e red  catastrophic,  and the probability of catastrophic  multiple fa i lures  
is S O  smal l  as to be negligible. 
have a reliability equal to  1 .  




exp [ - 11 (8,760) 
e. 
Optical and Transponder Bat ter ies :  U23, U33 
F o r  the optical and transponder bat ter ies ,  using ar-  
to those in  subsection 2(b) ,  P ( U 2 3 )  = P ( U 3 2 )  = 
x 0.907 . 
OR Gates,  Zener Diodes, Etc. : U14, U24, U34, U44 
14' '24' F r o m  Exhibit 1, it can  be  seen  that units U 
and U44, considered together, consis t  of 14 gate diodes, 3 zener  u34' 
diodes, and 1 command relay. 
in these components is g rea t e r  than 0.975. 
ys i s ,  it is c l ea r  that  only a small  proportion of the "failure" probability 
(0.025) is catastrophic. It is also easy  to demonstrate  that  each unit has  
a probability of failure (catastrophic and noncatastrophic) of l e s s  than 
0.01. 
The probability of no fai lure  whatsoever 
F r o m  the failure effect anal-  
Therefore ,  each unit will be considered to have a reliability equal 
to 1; i . e . ,  
f. Converters:  U15, U35, U45 
A "worst-case" analysis  of each se t  of redundant con- 
v e r t e r s  resul ts  in the assumption of a reliability equal t o  1 for  all three 
units. 
be operable at all times (more  severe  than is actually the case).  
re lay reliability is g rea t e r  than 0.995 at one yea r ,  assume it to be 1. 
The reliability of each unit is then given by 
This analysis proceeds as follows: Assume all converter  units to  
Since 
where  
fai lure  ra te  es t imate ,  and worst-case reliabil i ty calculations a r e  shown 
on the following page for  each of the three  units. 
Xc is the fai lure  rate for a single converter .  The pa r t s  count, 
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Failure Rate,  
1; x 106 Part Type, 
I A 
1. Trans is tors  0.26 
2. Diodes 0.13 
3. Resis tors  0.18 
4. Capacitors 0.01 
5. Inductors 0.05 
6. Transformers  0.25 
6 1 n3.Xi = 3.89 
i= 1 1 
Pa r t Quantity 
Main Memory Command 
Converter , C onve r t e  r , Converter , 
n n n 
1. 2.  3: 
I i i 
3 10  2 
29 29 7 
18 24 8 
57 37 27 
5 7 5 
2 2 2 
exp [-(9.11)(8,760) x = 0.9233 
exp [-(3.89)(8,760) x = 0.9657 
P(U45) = 1 - (1 - 0.9657)' = 0.999 
Again, since these rel iabi l i t ies  are  so high (and in fact are lower 
than would be derived under a detailed analysis) ,  it will  be assumed that 
P(U15) = P(U3)  = P ( u ~ ~ )  = 1 .
14 
g- OR Gate: U25 
Unit U25 is an  OR gate to  provide -32 volts to  the os- 
ci l la tor  section f rom ei ther  the main o r  the m e m o r y  converter.  
the logic of the previous subsection, 1 is a l so  a reasonable reliabil i ty 











3. Output Probability Calculations 
Exercising Equations (1) through (19) with the unit probabil- 
i t ies  developed in subsection 2 yields the following predictions of one- 





P ( W i ,  j )  at  One Year 










n nn7 u. 7 U l  
4. Reliability of Optical Beacon Power 
F r o m  Equation (20), the probability that the optical beacon 
power is available is readily seen to be simply the probability that the 
optical bat tery is operable (i. e. , 0.907). 
15 
5. Overall Power Supply F igure  of Meri t  
F r o m  the preceding subsections,  it is c l ea r  that ,  for  all 
pract ical  purposes, the power supply may be in one of eight possible 
s ta tes  corresponding to  the events of having o r  not having each of the 
th ree  batteries.  These eight s ta tes  a r e  represented below, where  "1" 
indicates that the battery is operable and l lO ' t  indicates that  the bat tery 
has  failed (open), 
Battery Relative 
Value, Vi Probability, Pi si Main Optical Transponder 
1 1 1 1 0.767 
1 1 0 0.750 0.07 9 
1 0 1 0.583 0.07 9 
1 0 0 0.333 0.008 
s5 0 1 1 0.933 0.056 
0 1 0 0.683 0.006 ' 6  
0 0 1 0.516 0.006 






' 8  
F r o m  Equation (21) ,  the overal l  power supply figure of m e r i t  is 
8 
FOM = 1 P.V. 2 0.935 . 
1 1  
i= 1 
The s ta te  probabilities of the above table a r e  readily der ived,  being 
simply the product of the reliabil i t ies and unrel iabi l i t ies  of the bat ter-  
ies.  The relative values a r e  derived as follows: Information f r o m  
NASA, as interpreted by PRC, yields the experiment  relative values 
indicated on the following page. 
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Experiment Relative Value 
Normalized 
Relative Value 
Optical beacon 5 5/12 
Doppler 4 4/12 
SECOR 2 2/12 
Range and range rate 1 1 / 1 2  
The normalized value is used to der ive the relative mission lo s s  a s s o -  
ciated with each experiment loss.  The experiment l o s ses  a r e  assumed 
to be independent and additive. 
t e r y  resul ts  in a par t icular  experiment l o s s ,  as shown below. 
Fur the rmore ,  l o s s  of a par t icular  bat-  
Batterv Loss Resultant ExDeriment Loss 
Main battery Doppler experiment during eclipse 
1 
Optical battery Optical beacon experiment  
Transponder battery 1 SECOR and range and range ra te  experiments  
The numeric loss  associated with lo s s  of the main bat tery is taken 
to  be the value associated with the doppler experiment  multiplied by the 
expected proportion of t ime that the satell i te is in eclipse. The f o r m e r  
value is 4/12 and the la t te r  is approximately 20 percent. Thus,  the nu- 
mer ica l  loss  is 0.067. 
Numerical losses  associated with the lo s s  of the other two bat ter-  
i es  a r e  simply the numerical  values associated with the experiments  lost. 
F o r  example, numerical  l o s s  of the optical bat tery is 5 /12  = 0.417, and 
numerical  loss of the transponder bat tery is 3/12 = 0.250. 
Summing the lo s ses  associated with each s ta te  and subtracting from 
unity yields the state values,  v i .  
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The analysis presented above indicates that  near ly  all unit 
fa i lure  probabilities a r e  negligible. This conclusion was  based on an  
This is due to the inability of the so la r  a r r a y s  to  sustain the required 
1 
load demand. 
possible, i s  considered as failure. 
Intermittent o r  sporadic ope ration during sunlight, while 
17 
extensive fai lure  effect  analysis of the unit in question, and all assump- 
tions in the numerical  analysis were  made in the direction of conserva-  
tism.l The final resul t  of a power supply figure of m e r i t  of 0.935 means 
that,  on the basis  of the analysis presented, at the end of one year  the 
power supply is expected to perform 93.5 percent of the function r e -  
quired of it. The fact  that MIL-HDBK-217 fai lure  r a t e s  were  used in 
the calculations leads one to believe that the est imate  is conservative 
(low). 
In conclusion, it seems c lear  that the power supply portion of the 
GEOS satell i te is extremely well designed f rom a reliabil i ty point of 
view. 
this  time. 
t icular ly  the optical and transponder bat ter ies)  would be the obvious focal 
point. 
Fu r the r  efforts t o  increase its reliabil i ty s e e m  unwarranted at 
If such efforts were  to  be expended, then the bat ter ies  (par -  
1 I The model equations and approach are presented in  detail so  that, i f  
f u r the r  study is des i red  in any o r  all a r e a s ,  it may be accomplished 
with a minimum of additional effort. 
18 
APPENDIX 




GEOS PRIME POWER SYSTEM FAILURE EFFECTS 
Fai lure  Effect No. 1: 





f .  
g. 
h. 
Loss of P r i m e  t 10.7 v d-c W12 
A shorted main bat tery when in com- 
mand lob. 
A shorted 11-volt zener  diode when 
in command loa. 
A shor t  to ground by a component 
within the selected main d-c /d-c  
converter ;  e. g . ,  (1) 1 zener  diode, 
( 2 )  ei ther of 2 t r ans i s to r s ,  o r  (3) 
1 of 13 capacitors.  
Loss of the entire solar  a r r a y ,  
which would cause eventual loss  
of the main bat tery;  this might be  
caused by an open of both telem- 
e t ry  sensing r e s i s to r s ,  TM1. 
An open bat tery o r  an open in both 
te lemetry sensing r e s i s to r s ,  TM3, 
either producing t h e  S ~ L U ~ :  effect 
(namely, fa i lure  of t 10.7 v d-c 
during eclipse).  
A shor t  to ground developing in the 
t 10.7 v d-c line connecting the 
te lemetry t ime marke r .  
A shor t  to  ground in  the boom squib 
and gravity-gradient attitude con- 
t ro l  unit. 





Fa i lu re  Effect No .  1: 
P o  s sible C aus e s : 
Fai lure  Effect NO. 2: 
Possible  Causes: 
Fa i lure  Effect No .  3: 
Possible  Causes: 
Loss of P r i m e  t 10.7 v d-c  W12 
A shor t  to ground a t  output point 
w52' 
An open wire  in the ha rness  o r  
main bus line. 
1. 
j -  
Loss of Output Voltage W22 
A shor t  to ground in the selected 
memory  converter.  This could be 
caused by one of four input capaci- 
t o r s  shorting; in the switching 
regulator c i rcui t ,  one of the fol-  
lowing might produce a shor t  in  
t rans is tor  Q103 that would produce 
a s imi la r  effect: 
capaci tors  failing short ,  ( 2 )  one 
diode failing short ,  o r  (3) one of 
two oscil lator t r ans i s to r s  in the 
converter  failing short .  
(1) one of th ree  
LOSS of Optical t 14.7 v d-c  W32 
a.  A shorted optical battery.  
b. A shor t  to ground at point W 2 2  
( see  1. h). 
A shor t  to ground at point W 5 2  
( s ee  l . i ) .  
An open bat tery o r  open te lemet ry  
sensing r e s i s to r s ,  TM4, causing 
loss  of t 14.7 v d-c  during ecl ipse 
and a l so  fa i lure  of optical beacon. 
Degradation of the so la r  a r r a y  to 
the point where  bat tery charge 






Fai lure  Effect NO. 3: 
Poss ib le  Causes  : 
Loss of Optical t 14.7 v l - c  W32 
An open wi re  in  the ha rness  o r  
t 14.7 v d-c  bus line. 
A shorted 8-watt power dump 
r e s i s t o r  when in  command 21b. 
A shorted 6-watt (one of two) power 
dump r e s i s t o r  with its associated 
thermostat ic  switch closed. 
f .  
g. 
h. 
Fa i lu re  Effect NO.  4: 
Poss ib le  Causes:  
Fa i lu re  Effect No .  5: 
P o  s s ible Causes  : 
Fa i lu re  Effect No.  6: 
Poss ib le  Causes:  





An open zener  diode (5.1 v d-c).  
Any of fa i lure  effects number 3 .  
A shor t  to ground in the sequence 
control ler  when commands 27b 
and 28b a r e  in effect. 
A shor t  to ground a t  output points 
W22  and W52. 
d. 
Loss of Output Voltage W52 
a. A shor t  to  ground in the command 
c. "Eve r t e  r 
A shor t  to ground in the power 
switching unit. 
b. 
Loss of Transponder  t 14.7 v d-c Wb2 
A shor t  to ground in SECOR with 
command 31a in effect. 
A shor t  to  ground in the range and 
range rate transponder with com- 
mand 3 la in  effect .  
A shor t  to ground in the SECOR 










Fa i lu re  Effect No. 6: 
Poss ib le  Causes: 
Loss of Transponder  t 14.7 v d-c  w62 
A shor t  to ground in  the voltage 
sensing cutoff with command 3 lb  
in effect. 





f .  A shorted 6-watt (manual) power 
dump re s i s to r  when in command 22b. 
A shorted 6-watt (automatic) power 
dump re s i s to r  with i t s  associated 
thermostat ic  switch closed when in  
command 22a.  
g. 
h. Two te lemet ry  sensing r e s i s to r s ,  
TM2, open, causing loss  of so la r  
a r r a y  leading to eventual loss  of 
bat tery charge.  
An open bat tery o r  an  open in both 
te lemet ry  sensing r e s i s to r s ,  TM5, 
ei ther  producing the s a m e  effect 
(namely, fa i lure  of t 14.7 v d-c  
during ecl ipse) ;  the so la r  a r r a y ,  
however, cannot support  maximum 
load requirements  without ba t te ry  
during sunlight. 
1. 
j. A shorted t ransponder  battery.  
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